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Abstract 
In this paper, it is analyzed how emotions and social environment affect people’s active and reflective learning processes. First, a 
conceptual analysis is made using recent insights from Cognitive, Affective and Social Neuroscience on the roles of emotions and 
social interactions on learning. Next, a computational analysis is made using a computational model of learning processes 
following these insights. In this analysis, neural mechanisms for the impact of both a person’s own emotions and the emotions of 
others are taken into account. In particular, it is considered how these impacts influence different learning types, such as active or 
reflective learners. The analysis shows how the impacts of emotions and social interaction strengthen the learning process. It is 
discussed how from these insights indicators can be obtained that can be used to design technology-enhanced learning 
environments able to exploit these impacts. 
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1.  Introduction 
Recently it has been advocated that new insights for learning and teaching can be gained from 
findings in Cognitive, Affective and Social Neuroscience (Immordino-Yang & Fischer, 2011). In 
particular, this has been put forward for the role of emotions and social interaction in learning 
(Immordino-Yang & Damasio, 2007; Immordino-Yang & Faeth, 2010). In the current paper this 
line is explored in a more specific manner by contributing neurologically based conceptual and 
computational analyses on how emotions and the social environment influence learning, in 
particular in relation to different learning styles such as reflective and active learners (Felder & 
Silverman, 1988, Felder & Brent, 2005).  
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Using relevant findings from a number of neurological theories on the role of emotions, 
reflection and social contagion in behaviour and learning (Damasio, 1999; Immordino-Yang & 
Damasio, 2007; Moore & Haggard, 2008; Iacoboni, 2008; Hebb, 1949), a qualitative causal 
model was designed and used for a conceptual analysis. Furthermore, by refinement and 
formalisation a dynamical computational model was obtained and used for a number of 
simulation experiments. In these experiments, the role of emotions, reflection and social 
interactions on active and reflective learning styles was explored in more detail. It was shown 
how affective states contribute to effectiveness of a learning process, thereby creating a personal 
and emotionally grounded awareness experience for the learner. To increase learning effects, a 
learner has to feel involved and attached to the elements in a learning process by experiencing 
ownership and responsibility for own choices and behaviour (Kolb & Kolb, 2005). Therefore, 
experiencing affective states relating to behaviours and becoming aware of them in a reflective 
manner form an important part of a learning process. In particular, this may concern affective 
states related to valuing specific options for how to address an issue (or problem) before deciding 
to choose for one. Moreover, it may concern feeling satisfaction (or lack thereof) on choosing a 
particular approach after it was executed. These feelings may provide emotionally grounded prior 
and retrospective awareness of such options, and thus may strengthen learning by reinforcing 
choices with positive evaluation. In a social context co-learners do not only interact in a cognitive 
sense but also by transferring affective states. Both facilitating the experience and exchange of 
emotions, and stimulating awareness of these emotions is an important basis for emotionally 
grounded forms of reflection, and can make an essential contribution to the learning process.  
The work reported above has identified several useful elements from the neurological domain 
concerning the learning process, such as Hebbian learning, internal simulation, interaction of 
emotion and cognition, emotion-related valuing of decision options, awareness states and 
reflection, mirroring and social contagion of emotion. In this paper, these elements were used as 
the basis of a conceptual and computational dynamical model that was developed to provide 
insight into the role of emotions and social interactions in learning processes. It is shown how the 
model was useful in conducting a variety of simulation experiments displaying how emotions 
and social interaction can strengthen different types of learning processes. Based on these 
findings, guidelines and support are offered for the development of technology-enhanced 
learning environments facilitating the role of emotions, reflection and social interaction in 
learning.  
In this paper, first, in Section 2 relevant neurological literature is briefly summarised. Using 
findings from this literature, in Section 3, a conceptual model is discussed, which is used for a 
conceptual analysis and the exploration of several guidelines in Section 4. In Section 5, the 
conceptual model is formalised to a computational model and used for computational analysis 
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2. Recent neurological insights relevant for affective and social influences in learning 
Recent developments in Cognitive Neuroscience have revealed mechanisms behind the 
generation and contagion of affective states, and the roles they play in mental processes involved 
in generating behaviour. In this section they will be briefly reviewed.  
2.1. Prior and retrospective awareness of behaviour  
It is often emphasized that for learning processes based on experiences for actions or 
behaviours, awareness of ownership and valuing of such experiences is of crucial importance. 
One example comes from Kolb and Kolb (Kolb & Kolb, 2005, p. 207) and reads: “To learn 
experientially learners must first of all own and value their experience”. In recent neurological 
literature mechanisms responsible for developing awareness of an action are reported (Moore & 
Haggard, 2008; Voss, Moore, Hauser, Gallinat, Heinz, & Haggard, 2010). A distinction is made 
between awareness prior to execution and retrospective awareness. Prior awareness is, among 
others, based on prediction of effects of a prepared action. In retrospective awareness in addition 
the monitored execution of the action and the sensed actual effects play an important role (Moore 
& Haggard, 2008; Treur, 2011). Prior awareness plays an important role in valuing action options 
and choosing or initiating the actual execution of an action. Retrospective awareness plays an 
important role in reflecting on one’s own functioning in order to learn from the consequences of a 
choice that was made, and adapt the valuation of that option for the future.  
To obtain prior awareness of an action, internal simulation is used as a means to predict the 
(expected) effects of a prepared action (Haggard, 2008; Wolpert, 1997). The idea behind internal 
simulation is that in a certain contexts (which may cover sensed aspects of the external world, but 
also internal aspects such as goals and attitudes) preparation states for actions are activated, 
which in turn through prediction links activate sensory representation states for (predicted) 
consequences of the action. Such an internal simulation process can go on in an arbitrary depth. 
The notion of internal simulation has a longer tradition, for example in the context of predicting 
effects of prepared motor actions (Becker & Fuchs, 1985), imagination (Hesslow, 2002), 
processes related to emotional responding (as-if body loops; Damasio, 1994, 1999), and reading 
another person’s mind (Goldman, 2006). Usually the predicted effects of a prepared action are 
valued. If this valuation is satisfactory, this may entail a ‘go’ decision for the actual execution of 
the action option, thus exerting control over action execution. In contrast, predicted effects valued 
as less satisfactory may lead to a ‘no go’ decision. 
Over the years the idea has developed that retrospective action awareness is based on some 
form of co-occurrence of predicted effects and sensed actual effects. Traditionally, this co-
occurrence was described by a ‘comparator model’ (Feinberg, 1978; Wolpert, 1997). More 
recently it has been analysed that the predicted effect and the sensed actual effect are in fact not 
compared but added to each other in some integration process (Moore & Haggard, 2008; Voss et 
al., 2010; Treur, 2011). 
2.2. The role of emotions in awareness and valuing of behaviour  
Awareness of behaviour has a strong emotional component. This relates both to the valuing of 
behaviour options before deciding and in retrospect after a behaviour has been executed. In recent 
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neurological literature this has been studied in relation to a notion of value as represented in the 
amygdala (Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2003; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Lee, 1999; 
Morrison & Salzman, 2010; Rangel, Camerer, & Montague, 2008). In opting for a particular 
behaviour, experiences with the environment (from the past) play an important role. In a 
retrospective process, by taking into account the experiences the valuations (and their related 
emotions) of behaviour options are adapted through learning processes. This is a form of 
adaptation. Parts of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and other areas in the human brain such as the 
hippocampus, basal ganglia, and hypothalamus have extensive, often bidirectional connections 
with the amygdala (Ghashghaei, Hilgetag, & Barbas, 2007; Morrison & Salzman, 2010; Salzman 
& Fusi, 2010). A role of amygdala activation has been found in various processes involving 
emotional aspects (Murray, 2007). Usually emotional responses are triggered by stimuli for 
which a predictive association is made of a rewarding or aversive consequence, given the context 
including the person’s goals. Feeling these emotions represents a way of experiencing the value 
of such a prediction, and to which extent it is positive or negative. In this sense the felt emotions 
strongly relate to prior valuation of an option. Similarly, feelings of satisfaction are an important 
element of retrospective valuation of what is experienced after behaviour has been chosen. These 
affective aspects of the concept of value form a point of departure of current work on the neural 
basis of decision making processes and economic choice in neuroeconomics (Bechara et al., 
2003; Bechara et al., 1999; Morrison & Salzman, 2010; Rangel et al., 2008; Sugrue, Corrado, & 
Newsome, 2005). 
2.3. Emotion contagion impact on behaviour  
In Section 2.2 it has been discussed how emotions relate to awareness of behaviour. In this 
subsection it is discussed how, in a social context, a learner’s processes can be strengthened by 
the affective states of others. Affective states play an important role as their occurrence in one 
person (a co-learner or tutor) can easily affect the same affective state in another (a learner). In a 
social context, the idea of emotion-related valuing can be combined with recent neurological 
findings on the mirroring function of certain neurons (Iacoboni, 2008; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 
2008). Mirror neurons are neurons that, in the context of the neural circuits in which they are 
embedded, show both a function to prepare for certain actions and a function to represent states 
of other persons. They are active not only when a person intends to perform a specific action (or 
body state), but also when the person observes somebody else intending or performing this action 
or body change. Indeed, if states of others are affecting some of the person’s own states that at the 
same time are connected via neural circuits to states that are crucial for the person’s own feelings 
and actions, then this provides an effective mechanism for persons to fundamentally affect each 
other’s actions and feelings. As mirror neurons make that some specific sensory input (an 
observed person) directly links to the relevant own preparation states, mirroring is a process that 
fully integrates mirror neuron activation states in the on-going internal simulation processes. This 
includes expressing emotions in body states, such as facial expressions. This mechanism of 
mirror neurons and internal simulation thus provides a neural basis for emotion contagion.  
Given the general principles described above, this mirroring function provides a mechanism 
by which emotions felt in different individuals about a certain considered behaviour mutually 
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affect each other, and, assuming emotion-related valuing, as such affect how by individuals 
behaviour options are valued. This means that both prior awareness of actions and retrospective 
awareness of behaviour can be affected by emotion contagion.  
2.4. On the role of reflection in behaviour 
It is widely accepted that reflection plays an important role in most learning processes (Moon, 
2004). Reflection can take place with respect to multiple aspects of a learning process, for 
example, on the learned knowledge or behaviour itself, on emotions, on goals and motivation, or 
on the planning over longer time periods. Reflection on these aspects contributes to an awareness 
of a personal and emotionally grounded experience for the learner. This avoids a type of learning 
process in which a learner acts in a detached manner involving hardly conscious reactive patterns 
in response to environmental cues that happen to be offered over time, as sometimes suggested in 
a behaviourist perspective on learning (Skinner, 1968). Here an opposite perspective on learning 
is adopted, according to which a learner is aware of his or her own choices and actions and 
experiences ownership and responsibility for them. Reflection covers (mental) activities during a 
learning process that contribute to this. The learner’s environment can stimulate such mental 
activities, for example, in the form of a tutor or coach asking specific questions that my provoke 
reflection, or a co-learner asking for explanation or displaying a specific behaviour and emotion.  
In the conceptual and computational model used in this paper, reflection regarding behaviour 
being learned is addressed. More specifically, it concerns reflection of the behavioural choices 
made to address encountered situations. This reflection is expressed by awareness of different 
options and their valuations prior to choosing one of them, and (in retrospect) awareness of the 
valuation of the chosen option after a choice was made and executed. On the one hand this 
perspective is in line with Damasio (1999)’s notion of core consciousness, which is based on the 
feeling of emotions and how these emotions are associated to a situation or object. This approach 
fully integrates emotions and reflection. On the other hand this perspective adopts the idea of 
multiple unconscious states and processes which occur in parallel and compete to become part of 
consciousness; see, for example, Dennett (1991)’s multiple draft model, and Baars’ Global 
Workspace Theory (1997). The Global Workspace Theory was developed to describe how a 
single flow of conscious experience is able to result from a large multiplicity of parallel 
(unconscious) processes. The general idea is that a winner-takes-it-all competition takes place to 
determine which of these processes will get dominance and will be included in the single flow of 
consciousness. 
2.5. The Hebbian perspective on learning 
In the above summary, no learning or adaptation of behaviour over time was discussed yet. 
This element is discussed here. In Hebb (1949), a principle was put forward describing how the 
strength of a connection between two states is adapted over time based on simultaneous 
activation of the two states (‘neurons that fire together, wire together’). The principle recently 
gained enhanced interest and this has resulted in more extensive empirical support (Bi & Poo, 
2001) and more advanced mathematical formulations (Gerstner & Kistler, 2002). This quite 
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simple principle turns out to be very useful in practice to explain or computationally model 
learning processes, and it will be used in the conceptual and computational model addressed here. 
The principle can be applied to the connections from sensory representations of stimuli to 
preparation states, and to the connections from preparation states to the associated (predicted) 
feeling states. Given the mechanisms of internal simulation and valuing described earlier, by 
adapting such connections the activations of specific behaviour options can change over time. 
 
 
3. Conceptual model for the role of emotions and social influence in different types of 
learning processes 
The analyses made in this paper assume a learning process where the learner encounters 
multiple items or situations over time for which decisions for an appropriate approach or 
behaviour have to be learned. Such learning processes are quite general; they occur in diverse 
contexts, varying, for example, from learning to address mathematics or physics problems by 
choosing effective approaches, to learning to undertake appropriate actions in the context of 
developing a healthy lifestyle. The contributed analyses address how emotions and social 
interactions affect this type of learning process. More specifically, learning processes are 
considered in which, for a specific context, a learner learns to choose between certain options (for 
actions or behaviours) to address an issue, for example, to solve a problem or to undertake an 
action. In accordance with what was discussed in Section 2, affective states play an important 
role in processes such as:  
• valuing different options before choosing one of them  
• experiencing a level of satisfaction when a chosen option leads to a state in accordance with the learner’s goals  
• experiencing a level of prior and retrospective awareness of behavioural choices made (reflection) 
• feeling adequate levels of self-confidence and motivation 
3.1. A conceptual model 
In this section the conceptual model is used as a basis for conceptual analysis of the role of 
emotion and social influence in learning.   
3.1.1. Sensory representations and preparation states 
For the model an encountered item is indicated in an abstract manner by a number of stimuli si. 
Note that these si may refer to multiple aspects and elements in reality, such as the elements of a 
mathematical problem description, or the different aspects of a context of a person in a healthy 
lifestyle development process. As a first step in the process, via the sensor states for si the learner 
generates internal sensory representations for the stimuli si indicating an encountered item. Such 
internal representations have associations (of different strengths) to preparation states for a 
number of alternative options bk to address the item, on which a decision has to be learned. In this 
decision making two further elements play an important role: the feeling state associated to the 
option bk, and the (reflective) awareness state for the option bk.  
455 Jan Treura and Arlette van Wissen /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  93 ( 2013 )  449 – 467 
3.1.2. Associated feeling states 
 Before performing an action, feeling states for the options bk are affected by predictive as-if 
body loops (cf. Damasio, 1994, 1999) via the sensory representation states for bk. This 
corresponds to the notion of internal simulation that results in a degree of prior awareness 
regarding a prepared action and its expected outcome. The as-if body loop predicts this 
evaluation value prior to execution of an action and by this valuing provides an important impact 
on the decision to be made. This valuation depends on the strength of the feeling associated to 
this option, which is represented by the strength of the connection from preparation state for bk to 
sensory representation for the option bk. After performing an action for bk, by an external 
execution loop the feeling state associated to bk is affected as well via the effector state for bk, 
expressing execution of option bk, the sensor state for bk and the sensory representation state for 
bk. Through these sensory states the action result is observed, which plays the evaluative role of 
retrospective awareness. The evaluation value is determined by the activation level of ther sensor 
state for bk which depends on the connection strength of the link from the effector state for bk to 
the sensor state for bk. High connection strength means success of the chosen option and low 
strength failure (in satisfying the learner). In short, the feeling state combines the prior awareness 
of the predicted effect and the retrospective awareness of the sensed actual effect, thus complying 
with the findings in (Moore & Haggard, 2008; Voss et al., 2010), as addressed in Section 2.  
3.1.3. Hebbian learning 
In the model the connection strengths of two types of connections are adapted by Hebbian 
learning: from sensory representation state for si to preparation state for bk (adapting direct 
associations), and from preparation state for bk to sensory representation state for bk (adapting the 
associations to feelings). As Hebbian learning depends on the activation levels of the connected 
states, a positive evaluation of a performed action has a positive effect on the learning, as in this 
case the sensory representation state for bk gets a higher activation level. When the connection 
strength from the preparation state for bk to the sensory representation state for bk has increased 
by the Hebbian learning mechanism, this implies that for a next occasion when the item is 
encountered the valuing of the option before a decision is made will be higher. In addition, 
through the sensory representation state for bk, and the feeling state for bk, the preparation state for 
bk obtains a higher activation value as well, which, again via Hebbian learning, increases the 
strength of the connection from sensory representation state for si to preparation state for bk. This 
way, both the direct association between represented stimulus and preparation, and the 
association between preparation and feeling used for valuing are adapted during the learning 
process. 
3.1.4. Reflection 
The activation of an awareness state for a behaviour option bk results in a degree of awareness for 
this option (prior or retrospective for the behaviour), as a way of modelling reflection. Activation 
of an awareness state not only depends on the sensory representations for the si but also on the 
feeling state associated to the option bk and the active goals g the person has. The connection 
between feeling and awareness state models the reflective influence of the feeling state for bk. 
This way the resulting awareness is grounded in feeling an emotion, in line with (Damasio, 
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1999). Moreover, the awareness states for different options are in competition with each other 
due to mutual inhibiting connections, following the perspectives of (Baars, 1997; Dennett, 1991). 
Purely reactive and other non-conscious responses to stimuli bypass the awareness states and are 
modelled by the direct links from goals and sensory representations to preparations. The 
awareness state thus serves a similar function as the global workspace in Global Workspace 
Theory, where sensory representations can be passed on to the global workspace and a 
competition determines which content then becomes conscious; cf. (Baars & Franklin, 2009).  
3.1.5. Impact of social interaction 
The effects of social interaction have their basis in the fact that the learner senses the 
expression of options by others: some of the stimuli s sensed the learner are actually stimuli sB,bk 
that indicate expression states for option bk of another agent B;. Such a specific type of stimulus 
indicates the extent to which option bk and their associated emotions are expressed by this agent 
B. For agents B in contact with the considered learner, these emotions are assumed to be sensed 
and represented by the learner using sensor states and representation states for sB,bk.  
As a form of mirroring a representation state for agent B’s expressed option bk has impact on 
the agent’s own preparation state for bk for the same option via the connection between the 
representation state and preparation state; see also Section 2. By this connection the preparation 
state for bk gets the functionality as a mirror neuron: it is not only activated when the learner him 
or herself prepares for the action, but also when another agent performing the action is observed. 
As a second effect, in the model the sensory representation state for agent B’s expression of the 
option bk also affects the awareness state for the option bk. This models a direct way in which 
interaction with another agent about an option stimulates to become (more) aware of the option. 
Thus the effect of social interaction on reflection is modelled in two ways: through the latter 
direct association, and through the mirroring process via the as-if body loop using the 
preparation, sensory representation and feeling states for bk. 
 
4. Conceptual analysis and guidelines for specific characteristics of learners and learning 
processes 
In this section, a conceptual analysis of the model is given by examining how the model is 
able to account for different learning phenomena and learner types as identified by literature. 
Some guidelines will be provided on how the model can be used to describe and simulate these 
learning processes.  
4.1. Different types of learners 
In their 1988 paper, Silverman and Felder identified a variety of learning styles based on the 
notion that learning is a two-step process involving (i) the reception and (ii) the processing of 
information (Felder & Silverman, 1988). One of the dimensions of learning styles addressed in 
their work concerns active and reflective learning styles; see also the Felder Index of Learning 
Styles (Felder & Silverman, 1988, Felder & Brent 2005). This dimension originates from a 
learning style model developed by Kolb (Kolb, 1984).  Recently, the Kolb model has seen some 
major revisions (Kolb & Kolb, 2005). It includes a new 9 learning style typology, sharing the 
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same underlying assumption addressed in (Felder & Silverman, 1988) that learning involves (i) a 
grasping experience (i.e., reception of information), and (ii) a transforming experience (i.e., 
processing of information). A further distinction is made: grasping type experiences are defined 
by the dimension of experiencing (feeling) and conceptualizing (thinking), while transforming 
experiences are defined by action and reflection. These different individual abilities for how to 
grasp and transform information can be combined to result in a learning space with different 
learning types. Individuals’ learning style positions them in this space according to the two 
dimensions. Each dimension is determined by a combination of individual characteristics and 
environmental factors. Note that individuals can have abilities to a certain degree, or have 
abilities that lie on both ends of one dimension (for example, being able to balance feeling and 
thinking). These dimensions can also be regarded as different parts of a learning cycle, showing a 
learner’s preference for one part of the cycle. A simplified overview of this combined learning 
space. 
 
Although these learning style dimensions are continuous and should not be regarded as 
either/or categories, the extremes are very effective to describe behavioral patterns. The poles of 
the dimensions describe persons with a strong preference or ability for that type of grasping or 
processing. In the remainder of this subsection, these poles will be used to show how the 
corresponding learning abilities relate to the conceptual model presented, and how this model can 
help to understand the dimensions more fully.  
First, learners who have feeling as dominant grasping learning ability rank high on the 
experiencing dimension and act on gut feelings rather than on logical analysis. Intuitive 
experience is often more important to them than processing the concrete representations. In the 
model, this relates to strong connections to and from the feeling states (see Figure 4, left-hand 
side). Information that is received will have a strong influence on (associated) feelings, which is 
represented by strong connections from the sensory representation (of b) states to the feeling 
states. Feelers are also more easily aware of intuitive emotions, represented by strong connections 
between de feeling states and the awareness states. Their emotions have a grounded influence on 
which goals and behaviour options get high activation levels, shown in strong connections 
between the feeling states and the goal and preparation states.    
Second, learners with strong thinking abilities prefer to solve problems and make decisions 
based on finding solutions to questions. They grasp information by focusing on the symbolic 
complexity of a problem and prefer abstract conceptualizations. In the model this corresponds to 
enhanced awareness represented by the awareness states where conscious content is shaped. That 
is, the sensory representation (of s) states, where internal representations of the stimuli and 
context are developed, have a strong connection to the awareness states, which in turn strongly 
influence the preparation states. Furthermore, the direct connections from the awareness states to 
the effector states are strong, enabling the thinker to let his or her actions be informed mostly by 
conceptual and symbolic representations, with a smaller part to play for the associated feelings.  
 
Third, learners with dominant reflective processing abilities have good capacities to internally 
reflect on the received information. They often need time to think things through in order to 
process the perceptual complexity of stimuli into abstract concepts.  Reflectors are good in 
generating ideas and come up with different approaches, but they are careful to translate them 
into actions. In the model, these learning abilities can be represented by an initially already 
stronger internal loop (which by learning is strengthened further) from preparation to sensory 
representation (of b) states through which the person is able to perform mental simulations and 
predictions of action consequences (see Figure 5, left-hand side). This reflector’s chain of thought 
based on internal simulation strongly influences the action options that become active.   
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Last, learners with a preference for acting in order to process information are more 
comfortable with, or better at, active experimentations. Testing and trying provides them with 
insights and they are able to learn from hands-on experience. For active learners, the connections 
from the preparation states to effector states, from the effector states to the sensor states (of b), 
and from these sensor states to the corresponding sensory representation states are strong (see 
Figure 5, right-hand side). Through their evaluations the actions inform further information 
processing. Furthermore, since actors often feel less comfortable with reflection and prefer to 
start exploring the behavioural aspects of a problem, in the model the connections between the 
sensory representations and the preparations states are strong, bypassing the awareness states.  
 
 
The model thus provides a framework for analysis of the factors that determine a learner’s 
experience and learning type. It can also be used as a tool to reason about the consequences of 
learning a different learning style (for example: a reflector who is being exposed to an 
educational setting in which active experimentation is required), or about the consequences of 
interactions between learners with different learning styles. For example, it appears that active 
learners prefer to work in groups, while reflective learners prefer to work alone or with a single 
familiar partner (Felder & Spurlin, 2005). Furthermore, teams with members with diverse 
learning styles among the members perform significantly better than teams with all members with 
the same learning style (Wolfe, 1977), and teams made up of members whose learning styles 
were balanced among the four learning modes performed better on a critical thinking task than 
teams whose members had specialized learning styles (Kayes, 2002). The model introduced in 
this paper can be used to create and analyze these and other scenarios of groups of leaners with 
different capabilities. This will be discussed in Section 5, based on a computational model that 
can be used for simulation. 
4.2. Guidelines for enabling conditions  
The conceptual model described in Section 3 has as its purpose to provide a basis for analysis 
and for design technology-enhanced learning environments in which emotions and their 
contagion are an important driving force. In such an environment, enabling and monitoring are 
key elements. In order to monitor and analyse in how far certain emotions occur and in how far 
they are transferred between different persons in a learning process, a number of technical 
devices can be used. In the area of affective computing usually the focus is on individual 
emotions and methods to measure or estimate them, for example, by sensing and interpreting face 
expressions, voice expressions, heart rate, or skin conductivity. Such methods can be used as far 
as they are not too obtrusive. However, the focus of the presented approach also covers the role 
of social interaction and the way in which emotions are transferred from one learner to another 
learner, or between a tutor or (virtual) coach and a learner. Therefore, more specifically, emotion 
transfer is to be enabled by the environment offered, and monitoring of this transfer should be 
incorporated. This means that different forms of interactions need to be analysed on their 
emotional content, for example, by recognition of figurative language and linguistic analysis, or, 
in case of direct visual interactions or the use of video connections, by analysis of face 
expressions.    
Not all emotions that are exchanged are relevant in general, but specifically when they are 
associated to particular types of mental states. Relevant examples of such mental states are: 
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• emotions related to prior awareness and valuation of behaviour options  
• emotions related to retrospective awareness and valuation of  chosen behaviour (satisfaction) 
• emotions related to goals 
• emotions related to attitude aspects 
 
Table 1 Emotion impact: Strengthening a mental state M, reflection on M, and empathy for M 
 
for mental state M type of 
interaction 
strengthening 
mental state M 
empathic understanding 
for mental state M 
strengthening 
reflection on M 




valuation of  chosen 
behaviour 
(satisfaction) 
• goals  
(long-term, short-
term) 







display of emotion for M: 
• nonverbal (face expressions, 
emoticons; e.g., ☺,,,,)  
• verbal (emotion-loaded language 
in speech and written form) 
nonverbal and verbal display of the other person’s 
emotion and verbal acknowledgement of recognition of 
the other person’s emotion in relation to M (face 
expressions, emotion-loaded language, emoticons) 
verbal interaction to 
make the learner aware 
of M via the 
experienced feeling 







virtual display of emotion in relation 
to M:  
• nonverbal (virtual face 
expressions, emoticons) 
• verbal (virtual emotion-loaded 
speech and text messages) 
virtual nonverbal and verbal display of the learner’s 
emotion and virtual verbal acknowledgement of 
recognition of the learner’s emotion in relation to M 
(virtual face expressions, emoticons, virtual speech and 
virtual text messages about the learner’s emotion in 
relation M) 
virtual verbal 
interaction on M 
(virtual speech and 
virtual text messages 
about M) 
 
Table 2  Enabling and monitoring different types of emotion impact 
 
One important impact is that due to emotion contagion the related mental states are 
strengthened, and because of that the associations between feeling and option are strengthened. 
Moreover, other relevant types of impact are experiencing and showing empathic understanding 
for such a state, and (through interaction) making aware the experiencing of the emotion felt, 
which is a contribution to reflection. Also these elements have an amplifying effect on the 
learning. Table 1 provides an overview of examples of these types of impacts. To be able to make 
use of the impacts of emotions in technology-enhanced learning, conditions can be identified 
enabling these effects, and for monitoring the transfer of the emotions. Table 2 shows an 
overview of examples of such aspects. Note that part of this is the organisation of the social 
network of learners: how they are connected. 
emotion 
impact 
verbal emotion impact nonverbal emotion impact for mental state M 






audio connection acoustic and 
linguistic 
speech analysis 
face expressions video connection emotion 
recognition from 
faces 




valuation of  chosen 
behaviour (satisfaction) 
• goals  
(long-term, short-term) 
• attitude aspects  
(e.g., beliefs)

























virtual text  
automated 
generation of text 
with emotions 
from generation graphical indications: 
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5.  Computational analysis of the role of emotions and social influence 
Modelling causal relations discussed in neurological literature in the manner as presented in 
previous sections and Figure 1 does not take large numbers of specific neurons into consideration 
but uses more abstract mental states. By this abstraction neurological knowledge is lifted to a 
mental (cognitive/affective) modelling level. The type of learner model that results shows some 
technical elements also used in the neural modelling area. More specifically, it takes states as 
having a certain activation level in the interval [0, 1] (instead of binary states), which, for 
example, makes reciprocal cognitive/affective loops possible. The modelling approach adopted 
from (Treur & van Wissen, 2012) exploits techniques used in continuous-time recurrent neural 
networks, in line with what is proposed in (Beer, 1995). In particular, for a state causally affected 
by multiple other states, to obtain their combined impact, first the activation levels  for these 
incoming states are weighted by the respective connection strengths ω thus obtaining ω 
and then these values are combined, using a combination function f(X1, .., Xn). In this case, a 
combination function based on a logistic threshold function has been chosen: 
 
f(X1, .., Xn) =    (

     -  

 ) ( )   
 
Table 3 shows which impacts contribute to the value of the different states (as can also be 
observed from Fig. 1) at any time point t. 
 
Table 3  Overview of the impacts on states 
 
5.1. Dynamics of activation levels of states 
Using the above combination function, dynamics of the activation levels of states are 
described by: 

V(t+Δt ) = V(t) + γ [ th(σ, τ, <combined_impact>) – V(t) ] ⋅ Δt    
 
state notation impacts on this state combined impact:   Σ  activation value . connection strength 
stimulus s stim(si) - -  
sensor state for s ss(si) stim(si) stim(si) ⋅ ω(stim(si), ss(si)) 
sensory representation for s srs(si) ss(si), goal(gk), srs(sj) ss(si) ⋅ ω(ss(si), srs(si)) + Σk goal(gk) ⋅ ω(goal(gk), srs(si)) +  
Σj srs(sj) ⋅ ω( srs(sj), srs(si))  
awareness state for b as(bk) srs(si), goal(gj), feel(bk), 
as(bm) 
Σi srs(si) ⋅ ω(srs(si), as(bk)) + Σj goal(gj) ⋅ ω(goal(gj), as(bk)) + 
feel(bk) ⋅ ω(feel(bk), as(bk)) + Σ as(bm) ⋅ ω(as(bm), as(bk)) 
goal for g goal(gg) ss(si), as(bk), feel(bk), 
goal(gf) 
ss(si) ⋅ ω(ss(si), goal(gg)) + as(bk) ⋅ ω(as(bk), goal(gg)) + 
feel(bk) ⋅ ω(feel(bk), goal(gg)) + Σf goal(gf) ⋅ ω(goal(gf), goal(gg)) 
sensor state for b ss(bk) es(bk) es(bk) ⋅ ω(es(bk), ss(bk)) 
sensory representation for b srs(bk) ss(bk), prep(bk) ss(bk) ⋅ ω(ss(bk), srs(bk)) + Σk prep(bk) ⋅ ω(prep(bk), srs(bk)) 
feeling for b feel(bk) srs(bk) srs(bk) ⋅ ω(srs(bk), srs(bk)) 
preparation state for b prep(bk) srs(si), as(bk), goal(gg), 
feel(bk), prep(bm) 
Σi srs(si) ⋅ ω(srs(si), prep(bk)) + as(bk)  ⋅ ω(as(bk), prep(bk)) +   
Σg goal(gg) ⋅ ω(goal(gg), prep(bk)) + feel(bk) ⋅ ω(feel(bk), prep(bk)) + 
Σm  prep(bm)⋅ ω(prep(bm), prep(bk))  
effector state for b es(bk) as(bk), prep(bk) as(bk) ⋅ ω(as(bk), es(bk)) + prep(bk) ⋅ ω(prep(bk), es(bk)) 
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Here <combined_impact> is the combined impact as specified in the last column of Table 3.  Note 
that ω(X, X) = 0 is assumed as a convenient notation. Parameter γ is an update speed parameter. 
5.2. Dynamics of connections based on Hebbian learning 
For the connections from srs(si) to prep(bk) and from prep(bk) to srs(bk) their strengths are adapted using the 
following Hebbian learning rule, taking into account a maximal connection strength , a learning rate η, and an 
extinction rate ζ (usually taken small):  
 
ω(prep(bk), srs(bk))(t+Δt)  =   ω(prep(bk), srs(bk))(t) + [η prep(bk)(t). srs(bk)(t).(1 - ω(prep(bk), srs(bk))(t)) – ζ ω(prep(bk), srs(bk))(t)] Δt 
 
ω(srs(si), prep(bk))(t+Δt)  =  ω( srs(si), prep(bk))(t) + [η srs(si)(t).prep(bk)(t). (1 - ω( srs(si), prep(bk))(t)) - ζ ω( srs(si), prep(bk))(t)] Δt      
A similar Hebbian learning rule can be found in (Gerstner & Kirstler, 2002, p. 406]. By the factor 
1 - ω(prep(bk), srs(bk))(t) (resp. 1 - ω( srs(si), prep(bk))(t)) the learning rule keeps the connection strengths 
bounded by 1 (which could be replaced by any other positive number); Hebbian learning without 
such a bound usually provides instability. When the extinction rate is relatively low, the upward 
changes during learning are proportional to the activation levels of both connected states and 
maximal learning takes place when both are 1. Whenever one of these activation levels is 0 (or 
close to 0) extinction takes over, and the connection strength slowly decreases (unlearning). 
5.3. Computational analysis based on simulation experiments 
This subsection describes simulation experiments that were performed in order to demonstrate 
the how the computational model described above can be used to analyse the dynamics of the 
modelled learning processes in a more detailed manner. For the experiments, a scenario is 
considered with two learners: Alice and Bob. Alice and Bob both try to learn an appropriate 
response to a stimulus (for example, a proper approach to a mathematical problem). For the sake 
of simplicity, here it is assumed that there is one appropriate response to the stimulus, namely 
behaviour b1 (with expression denoted as es(b1)), that Alice and Bob are learning.  The activation 
level of this expressed behaviour b1 is considered an indication of how well this behaviour has 
been learnt, seen from an externally observable perspective. From an internal perspective, the 
strengths of the connections from stimuli representation for s1 to preparation states for b1 and 
from preparation to feeling states for b1 are considered indications of how well the behaviour has 
been learnt. In relation to these indications, the learning speed relates to the steepness of the 
graphs of the activation levels of these states and connection strengths over time. The simulations 
provide a closer look at the dynamics of leaners with different feeling and thinking capabilities. 
The parameter settings used for these simulations (and for all other simulations described in this 
work) can be found in Table 4 and 5. Note that the extinction rate is chosen 0 in order to clearly 
demonstrate the learning process without unlearning or forgetting.  
 
Table 4. Threshold and steepness values used in the simulation scenarios 
 




  	    	  
	         
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5.3.1. Effects of feeling capabilities on learning 
 
First the case is considered in which Alice and Bob have different learning styles with respect to 
feeling. For Bob feeling is a dominant learning style; in the model his feeling states are strongly 
connected to his sensory representation states and his awareness, goals and preparations states (ω 
= 0.9, see also Section 4.1, Figure 4). In contrast, Alice does not include her feelings much in the 
learning process, which is modelled by very weak connections to and from her feeling states (ω = 
0.1). An overview of the connection values can be found in Table 6. Note that the inhibitory and 
excitatory relations of competing states are 0, as for these scenarios only one proper behaviour 
option is considered with no competing goals or awareness states.  
 
 
Table 6. Connection weight values used for a learner with feeling capabilities. 
























 to stim ss(s) srs(s) goal as prep ss(b) srs(b) feel es
from








      
 stim - 1 0         
ss(s)
ss1 (stim)  0 0 1  0.8      
ss2 (es 
other)  0 0  1 0.5      
srs(s)
srs1    0 0  0.6 0.5    
srs2    0 0  0.6 0.5    
goal
    0.2 0 0 0.2 0.2    
as       0.2 0 0.5    0.5
prep         0  0.1  0.8
ss(b)          - 0.8  
srs(b)           0 <0.1, 0.9> 




0.9>   - 
es   0 social:0.8      1   -
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As literature indicates that a good performing learner has capabilities across all dimensions (e.g, 
Kayes, 2002), it is expected that Bob would learn faster and better than Alice. In Figure 6 all state 
activations can be seen for Alice and Bob. This simulation shows how Alice and Bob perform 
when learning separately, which explains why there is no activation in the sensor input and 
representation states of another learner (ss(es1) and srs(s2)); see also section 3.1.5. The fact that 
Bob has a dominant feeling strategy can clearly be deduced from the activity in the feeling state 
(feel(b1)), which shows regular activity for Bob, but hardly any for Alice. Consequently, the goal, 
awareness and preparation activations are all significantly higher for Bob than they are for Alice. 
The same holds for the resulting effector state (es(b1)) that represents the action and for its 
valuation states (ss(b1) en srs(b1)). Figure 6 also shows that the association between preparation 
and sensory representation states used for valuing (ω(prep(bk), srs(bk))) reaches its optimal value of 1 
quicker for Bob than for Alice. In sum, Bob will reach higher activation levels for the appropriate 
response and will learn the corresponding valuations quicker than Alice.   
                 
 It is now examined how Alice and Bob influence each other’s learning process when learning 
together. Inspired by Wolfe (1977)’s work in which it was observed that teams with diverse 
learning styles among the members perform better than teams with all members with the same 
learning style, it was hypothesized that learning together will strengthen Alice’s learning as she is 
able to benefit from the feeling capabilities of Bob. The sensor and sensory representation state 
for another learner (ss(es1), srs(s2)) now show different activation levels for Alice and Bob: Alice 
receives a high activation level from the observed effector state from Bob, whereas Bob receives 
somewhat lower activation levels resulting from the lower effector state of Alice. Overall, even 
though Alice still has little to no feelings that are associated with the stimulus, she now has higher 
activation levels for her goal, awareness and preparation states, resulting from the incoming 
activation that is the result of observing Bob. Consequently, her effector states show higher 
activation levels when learning together than when learning separately: es(b1) has activation 
levels of 0.48 versus 0.59, respectively. Also, the learning association ω(prep(bk), srs(bk))  is optimized 
faster than when learning alone. Bob maintains his high activation and learning levels.    
              
            
5.3.2. Effects of thinking capabilities on learning  
 
Another pair of simulations was performed to analyse the effects of different thinking 
capabilities. In this scenario, Bob has thinking as a dominant learning style, indicated by strong 
incoming and outgoing connections of the awareness state (ω = 0.9). Alice on the other hand has 
trouble to grasp the symbolic or abstract conceptualizations of a problem. She has weak 
connections to and from her awareness state (ω = 0.1). 
 Figure 8 shows the activation levels of Alice’s and Bob’s states when learning separately. The 
difference between Alice and Bob is striking: Bob reaches high activation levels for his states, 
while the low awareness state for b1 (as(b1)) of Alice do not contribute to any activation, resulting 
in very low activation for her effector state for  b1 (es(b1)). When looking at the results from 
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Hebbian learning (the three graphs at the bottom of Figure 8), it can be seen that the learning 
process for both the adaption to direct associations between sensory representations of stimuli si 
and preparations for bk (ω(srs(si), prep(bk))) and the adaption of the connection from preparation to 
feeling  bk  (ω(prep(bk), srs(bk))) has much slower progress for Alice than for Bob. It is clear from this 
simulation that the awareness state plays a crucial role in the learning process.   
 When learning together, a similar pattern as for the feeling simulations can be observed. From 
Figure 9 it is clear that although Alice’s awareness state still has low activations, her other states 
are far more active, resulting in a much higher effector state (es(b1), increased from 0.29 to 0.44). 
The Hebbian learning of the connections is faster. In short, learning together involving observing 
Bob’s behaviour, helps Alice to be a better learner. 
               
 
5.3.2. Effects of learning together on individual learning 
 
In more detailed simulation experiments it has been investigated how beneficial it is for a 
reasonably good thinking style learner to interact with another thinking style learner. The social 
interaction effect differs for different strengths of thinking style learner A (let’s call her Alice 
again) upon learner B (Bob) with a thinking style component of 0.7. In Figure 10 it is shown that 
when the learning process is long enough, the final effect on the behaviour of Bob is limited. The 
base line for Bob for learning his behaviour without social interaction is 0.66, and by social 
interaction this can be increased to 0.76, depending of the strength of Alice as a thinking style 
learner. So in this respect the social interaction provides a modest benefit for Bob, even when 
Alice performs worse than he does.  
It has also been analysed how fast the learning proceeds with different strengths of a co-
learner. The results are shown in Figure 11. The figure shows the time duration that is elapsed 
before reaching connection strength 0.8 for the two connections that are adapted by Hebbian 
learning. The graph at the left-hand side shows the connection from preparation to sensory 
representation of b. A substantial reduction the learning time of Bob occurs when the strength of 
the thinking style of Alice is above 0.7, which is the strength of Bob’s thinking style. Note that 
for the nonsocial case this duration is 178 time units. These results seem to indicate for these 
specific circumstances that without social interaction almost the same behaviour can be learned, 
but the time to learn the same level of behaviour may be substantially longer without social 
interaction. However, the graph at the right-hand side for the connection from sensory 
representation of the stimulus s to preparation of b shows no reduction of the learning time of 
Bob. Here for the nonsocial case the duration to reach a learning rate of 0.8 is 59 time units, 
which is the same for both Alice and Bob in the social scenario when they have a thinking style 
component larger than 0.7. One explanation could be the case that 59 time units is the optimal 
speed of learning for all learners with a dominant thinking style. An alternative hypothesis is that 
learners with a strong thinking component do not rely heavily on direct processing of information 
from the sensory representations to the preparation nodes and optimization takes place elsewhere.   
6. Discussion 
The perspective followed in this paper is in the spirit of what is advocated in (Immordino-
Yang & Damasio, 2007; Immordino-Yang & Faeth, 2010). An important difference is that the 
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latter work is informal and rather general whereas in the current paper the ideas are more concrete 
since the ideas are formalised and analysed both in a conceptual and computational manner for 
specific types of learners. The conceptual and computational models are based on recent 
neurological insights concerning a number of relevant processes: internal simulation (Damasio, 
1994), interaction of emotion and cognition, emotion-related valuing (Bechara et al., 2003), 
awareness states and reflection (Baars, 1997), mirroring and social contagion of emotion 
(Iacoboni, 2008; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2008) and Hebbian learning (Hebb, 1949). For example, 
the models used are in accordance with recent neurological insights that processing and 
interpreting sensory information (grasping), and preparing for actions, are often not isolated 
processes but are in principle strongly intertwined (Pulvermüller & Fadiga, 2010). 
The basic learning model includes elements of stimulus-response association learning (for the 
connections between stimuli representations and preparation states) as known from the 
behaviourist tradition (Skinner, 1968), but extends this substantially by providing possibilities to 
integrate emotional elements in the learning process (for the connections between preparations 
and feelings), and of how these are affected by social contagion of emotions. Furthermore, the 
model incorporates a notion of awareness of actions as a basis for the roles of thinking and 
reflection in learning. Learning together as addressed here means that both learners learn and can 
observe each other’s learning process and behaviour. Note that cases in which one learner, in a 
kind of tutor role, explicitly provides help to another learner were not addressed in the model. 
Although the reported experiments have been designed to illustrate the principles of the approach 
for two interacting learners, they can easily be extended to larger groups of learners. An issue for 
further research may be to investigate more extensively by computational analysis how exactly 
learning results depend on different combinations of learning styles present in groups with more 
members. 
The conceptual model and the computational model provide means to analyse learning 
processes with different types of learners, more specifically the effect of emotions and social 
interaction on these processes. In particular they provide a basis for the design and testing (in 
silico, by simulation) of technology-enhanced learning environments that enable and support 
emotions in individual and social contexts. Simulations as performed in section 5 can inspire new 
hypotheses and specifications of learning theories.  
The model provides two types of indications for how well behaviour has been learnt: from an 
externally observable perspective and from an internal perspective. From the external perspective 
the activation levels of expressed behaviours (upon offering the stimuli) are considered an 
indication. From the internal perspective, the strengths of the connections from stimuli 
representation to preparation states for the behaviour, and from preparation to feeling states for 
the behaviour are considered indications of successfulness of the learning process. Moreover, 
indications for the learning speed are found in the steepness of the graphs of the activation levels 
of these states and connection strengths over time. Note that the internal and external perspective 
need not provide the same indications. Based on the given models, it might well be the case that 
learners based on modest internal connections show good results in externally observable 
behaviour, or conversely, that learners with strong internal connections perform weaker with 
respect to observable behaviours. This may be an issue for further research.  
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